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I 425 same time, the term obscures the constructed nature of the relationship between a man and his sister-in-law by stressing her biological relation to her sister rather than the legally significant relation to her sister's husband (whereas "sister-in-law" would stress the latter and call attention to the legal construction of the bond). Moreover, it sensationalizes the whole issue with the reminder that someone must be deceased before the relationship becomes significant. A protracted argument about whether a man may marry his sister-in-law after his wife's death may seem an unlikely case, but the debate raised issues central to the Victorians' sense of themselves as rational, moral, and domestic.
The deceased wife's sister question focuses attention on that most sacred, yet most fragile, of Victorian institutions, the heterosexual, nuclear family. It also interrogates masculine desire: why would a man want to marry his sister-in-law, anyway, and what are the issues involved in remarriage? Most importantly, the debate enacts the common "shifting" that woman's identity always undergoes when it is conceived primarily in relation to others; the deceased wife's sister, like most Victorian women, has no single self-identity but is always (potentially or actually) a sister, a wife, a mother.2 Writ large in her anomalous position is the preference Victorian England expressed for all of its daughters: that they become (and remain) sisters, safely defined through a family relationship, yet asexual, undesiring. This insistent yearning for an asexualized domestic relationship haunts Eliot's sonnets as it haunts the debates over the deceased wife's sister. The sister is caught, then, in a web of relationships mediated by nature and culture, biology and law, and in the conflicts between them we see the solid structure of the family unraveling. Caught in those shifting definitions, the sister cannot contain all the roles a woman might desire or be required to undertake. And while the deceased wife's sister may indeed become sister, wife, and mother all in one, the significance of her originary, defining relationship to her sister is lost in the shuffle -as are her desire, her freedom, and her voice. The seven-decade debate over marriage with a deceased wife's sister offers an unparalleled glimpse of the ways Victorian culture dealt with female sexuality and suggests as well the origins of some of the abiding present-day anxieties about the family and incest. It further demonstrates the centrality of the sister-brother bond in Victorian culture; the sister becomes the unsung heroine of Victorian life, the ideal woman beon marrying a brother's widow, and I suspect that the focus on the deceased wife's sister is a focus on the status of a presumably virginal, sexually inexperienced female -one more way that this discussion is really about sexual desire rather than marriage laws.
2 See Gruner 1997 for a discussion of role-shifting mothers.
hind the popular image of the Angel in the House. Analyzing pamphlets, speeches, and novels published to promote either side of the debate, I first map out the ground occupied by liberals and conservatives in the debate, especially in relation to a shifting definition of family, and then demonstrate how the winning liberal argument actually entraps women into the role of the asexual "little sister" whom Eliot idealized in her "Brother and Sister Sonnets" and who became a particularly insidious version of the Victorian feminine ideal. Prohibited by canon law since Elizabeth I, marriage with a deceased wife's sister was nonetheless an occasional, and generally acceptable, occurrence over the centuries, a sister-in-law making a convenient replacement for her dead sister as both wife and (step-)mother.3 Despite the church's official disapproval, such marriages were rarely challenged in the ecclesiastical courts that regulated marriage and were therefore effectively legitimated -until 1835 and Lord Lyndhurst's Marriage Act. This act, bringing parliamentary law in line with canon law, rendered null all unions outside the "prohibited degrees" after August 31, 1835, while at the same time legitimizing those made before that date.4 The ostensible reason for the act was to legitimate the issue of a nobleman's marriage with his own deceased wife's sister; the addendum nullifying later marriages was inserted to placate the bishops in the House of Lords and was widely expected to be revoked the following year. In fact it remained on the books for seventytwo more years.
The issue of the deceased wife's sister engaged the Victorian imagination not only in the public debates over the issue but in literary representations as well. The deceased wife's sister mediates between two important roles in the family. In her family of origin, she is her sister's sister, her boon companion and closest female friend.5 In her sister's new family, she is cast as the husband's sister as well, thus becoming the brother's sister, a figure of vital importance in a wide range of Romantic and Victorian literature.
3 See esp. Behrman 1968 for a review of the theological arguments regarding marriage with a deceased wife's sister. The primary justification for the ban lies in the "one flesh" doctrine, which holds that as husband and wife are made one flesh in marriage, the relatives of one become at once the relatives of the other. Much ink was spilled over the question of whether this state of affairs continued after the death of one of the partners. 4 The prohibited degrees are those people with whom the Church of England determined that marriage would be incestuous: parents, children, siblings, uncles, aunts, in-laws; it might even be said that the figure. 8 The wife's sister fits right into this pattern, subordinating herself to a sister and a brother-in-law in order to have a place in that all-important unit, the family. The sister is an extreme version of that Victorian ideal, the "relative creature" or relational self found in conduct literature and fiction alike (Ellis 1839, 123).9 But this relational 6 Homans reads the brother-sister relationship of Eliot's sonnets through and against Wordsworth. She sees the relationship in both the sonnets and TheMill on the Floss as providing an ambivalent security of identity to the sister; by focusing on the brother, she can be someone, have an identity, even if that identity is rooted in pain, loss, and rejection. Homans reads the sonnets as a specifically female revision of Wordsworth, in which the sister must learn to embrace realism rather than the romanticism that such scenes engender in Wordsworth's male narrators (1986, chap. 6). The sister, in most discussions of the bill, is a silent participant in the conflict. Defined more by her relationship to the dead than to the living, to the past rather than to the present or future, she figures most often as an object of exchange between men, as in the following anecdote about a man who was widowed in January 1840, after twenty-four years of marriage. He had five daughters, two "grown up" (in their twenties) and three in the schoolroom. The eldest daughter married, and the second died, so he was left with a family of three young daughters. Also residing in the house was the girls' aunt, his wife's sister, who had lived with her sister and brother-in-law since their marriage in 1816.12 In October 1844, this widower married his children's aunt, thus, in the eyes of current British law, committing incest by marrying a member of his immediate family (Hope 1849, 56-58). The anecdote became a matter of public record in an 1849 pamphlet, in which, as in most discussions of the deceased wife's sister, the woman herself does not speak. Instead, the marriage is urged by her own brother, who, in a remarkable letter to his brother-in-law, writes, "It would be one of the happiest days of my life, in which I can congratulate you as the husband of my sister" -as he had presumably already done once, some twenty-eight years earlier (57).
Novels of the time did, however, represent and occasionally even give voice to the deceased wife's sister, thus providing another avenue for insight into the often vexed relationships among law, family, and subjectivity. For the deceased wife's sister does not, in some sense, even exist until the law creates her, constructing her as not just any sister-in-law but a particular one, not just any sister but a desired and desiring one. As Judith Butler notes, paraphrasing Michel Foucault, "Juridical systems of power produce the subjects they subsequently come to represent.... The subjects regulated by such structures are, by virtue of being subjected to them, formed, defined, and reproduced in accordance with the requirements of those intrinsic to nineteenth-century family life and culture uneasily mix and collide" (1992,
167-68).
12 One important, and overt, element of the deceased wife's sister debate is the concern, expressed in varying degrees throughout the nineteenth century, over the so-called redundant woman, the middle-class spinster who failed-through demographic shifts, personal attributes, or familial responsibilities -to find a suitable mate. instability in the face of legal interventions. It concerns two orphaned sisters whose lack of a religious upbringing dooms them to unhappiness and envy. Elizabeth, the elder, marries Richard Clayton on the condition that her younger sister, Agnes (whom he has not met), be allowed to live with them. He agrees, but when he first sees Agnes, Elizabeth experiences a shock of jealousy: "Her future husband was standing with his eyes fixed on Agnes, gazing at her with a look of the most warm and unqualified admiration, a look such as had never been bestowed on herselfl" (Skene 1849, 30). Elizabeth calms herself with the thought that "in a very few days, Richard Clayton would hold for Agnes Maynard the sacred name of brother. They twain [Richard and Elizabeth] were about to be made by a most holy ordinance ONE FLESH, and from that hour her sister must be his sister also, in the sight of God and man" (31; emphasis in original). For Elizabeth (and, I would argue, for Skene), an in-law is real family: a new family relation will be constructed through her marriage. Although her jealousy is misplaced, the reassurance that she chooses fails her, for, after overhearing her husband take the liberal side in a conversation about the Deceased Wife's Sister Bill some years later, she can no longer contain her jealousy. She becomes sick (presumably with jealousy), gives birth to a premature son, and dies, leaving her husband with the baby and an older daughter. Agnes steps in as devoted caretaker to her brother-in-law and to her sister's children. The narrator comments, "This state might have continued long, and their contentment would doubtless but have increased as they saw the children improving in health, and Richard acquiring great influence in the county; but they were doomed to suffer by that fatal laxity of principle, which has caused it to be considered as apossibility in Christian England that a man should become the husband of one who is virtually his sister!" (66; emphasis in original). Once the possibility is raised, however, Richard and Agnes marry, and their lives rapidly disintegrate. After Agnes bears a son (Edward), Richard's first-born son by her sister dies. Years later, Richard himself dies in an attempt to save his daughter, Mary, from suicide; Mary then succumbs to a brain fever that leaves her an idiot; Edward dies of dissipation. At the end of the novel, the deceased wife's sister herself, a bereaved and outcast widow, is left to care for her sister's idiot daughter and repent her misspent life. Finally penitent, she turns to the church and accepts her miserable lot.
In this novel, as in the pamphlets, the deceased wife's sister is portrayed as both a victim of male lust and a maternal substitute for her sister. Although the novel centers on her, she is often oddly blank; her own feelings are rarely addressed except in her final penitence. Indeed, for the most part, women's voices -those of the sister or any other woman -are remarkably absent from the debate. A. J. B. Hope seems to have believed that women would be on the anti-reform side when he enlisted their voices in the cause:
"Why is it that we hear so little of the women? Is this only a man's question?" (1849, 37). It appears from the evidence of the pamphlets that it was; indeed, Margaret Gullette suggests that the controversy might more accurately have been titled "the Case of the Widower's Convenience" (1990, 147). Matthew Arnold too agreed that it was a "man's question," casting it as an instance of "that double craving so characteristic of our Philistine, and so eminently exemplified in that crowned Philistine, Henry the Eighth -the craving for forbidden fruit and the craving for legality" (1891, 172-73). Arnold argued that women's "subtle instinctive propensions and repugnances" should "enlarge [their husbands'] spiritual and intellectual life and liberty" and thus convince the husbands to oppose the ban's repeal (174). Arnold is rare, on the side of the ban's proponents, in his appeal to woman's nature; yet, like other entrants into the debate, he considers women only as private "influences," not as public participants.
Rather than giving voice to the women, Skene's remarkable novel relies primarily on ungendered authorial commentary to make its point in favor of the ban, presenting an argument that is standard in the pamphlets as well: permitting marriage between these relations will permit sexual attraction between them, rendering illicit and immoral what had been an innocent and useful arrangement for all concerned-an unmarried woman living with her married sister's family. Indeed, the cornerstone of the antireform movement was the notion that the prohibition of marriage prevents sexual attraction. Hope, one of Parliament's most outspoken proponents of the ban, quoted the Archdeacon of London on the subject: "[The prohibition] has, I think, extended the feeling of brotherhood and sisterhood to those who are not 'consanguinei,' but only 'affines'; and it is for I Gruner the sake of this feeling of relationship, which is of the purest kind, and the existence of which appears to me, on the whole, so much more beneficial to society than the non-existence of it would be, that I should be very sorry to see this pure relationship destroyed for the sake of persons who do not value it" (1849, 50). An American opponent of marriage with a deceased wife's sister, the pseudonymous Domesticus, argued the same point with a rhetorical fervor common to the defenders of the prohibition: "Abolish this law; expel this household God: let it be publicly and distinctly understood that the body of a sister-in-law, is no more than any other female body, and to do this, you need only let the parties understand that after the death of the present wife they may mary; what will follow? Why, I will tell you sir, what will follow. -We shall hear by and by, tales that will make our ears to tingle" (1827, 31; emphasis in original). The "tales that will make our ears to tingle," which Domesticus subsequently recounts, turn out to be fairly similar to the plot of Skene's novel, in which a loving sister is transformed into a homewrecker (wittingly or no) by the possibility that she and her brother-in-law may marry. This law, in other words, produces their relationship as family; without the law, and a common faith in the law, the family will fall apart. Domesticus goes even further than this, claiming that "the Law of Incest is the great moral safeguard appointed by Providence for protecting the laws ofMarriage and Chastity" (12; emphasis in original). Arguments in favor of changing the law tend to agree with those opposed in one important particular: neither wants to admit to the centrality of sexual desire in the formation of the family. 5 For the conservative side, this means banning sexual relationships between all but husband and wife within a family. For the liberals, it almost suggests banning them entirely. Rather than focusing on sexual desire between a man and his wife's sisterwhich might raise the specter of incest, as it does for the conservativesthe most common argument for altering the law sidestepped the question of incest entirely, using another blood tie, motherhood, to promote the bill as a "children's relief bill." A sister-in-law, this argument goes, will make the best stepmother for her dead sister's children, because she is already related to them (Debate 1895, 22n.). Real stepmothers (those imported, as it were, from outside the family circle) are wicked, according to this line of reasoning, but an aunt would never be a real stepmother because of the preeminent bond of blood. One supporter of the bill put it bluntly: "The advantage of bringing into play the affection of an aunt to neutralise the natural harshness of a stepmother has been recognised by all mankind, with the exception of the early Fathers" (Debate 1895, 59). Another anonymous writer expanded on the idea: "Where there are young children, no second marriage can be so likely to restore the happiness of families as that of the husband with the sister of the deceased wife. In any other marriage the children become so many incumbrances to the stepmother, and the feeling between them is rather one of duty than affection. Affection may grow up, 14 Although the use of the terms liberal and conservative here may seem counter to contemporary usage, it amply demonstrates the shifting nature of these seemingly stable terms. Victorian Tories were, of course, far more likely than Liberals to have recourse to custom for their justification, while Liberals often looked to more scientific-but essentializing-rationales such as biology and physiology '5 This is not, of course, to argue that the Victorians were so prudish as to deny sexuality or so ignorant as to be unaware of its relationship to family life. As Michael Mason helpfully puts it, there are differences--often wide -between behavior and belief when it comes to sexual matters (1994, see esp. chaps. 2 and 3). My argument here, then, has little if anything to do with the actual practices of Victorian sexuality, and everything to do with its representation. It is also clear that the attempts to ban sexuality, or the appearance of sexual desire, within the family are largely about the control of female sexuality. The husband is always expected to desire, and to marry; the sister/wife's status is the only thing at stake. 
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I 435 but experience shows that more frequently discord takes its place, especially where there are children by the second wife" (Antiquary 1880, 28). The construction of the "natural" family that can never fully accept a stepmother is premised on another "natural" fact: women are naturally maternal and will naturally nurture children of their own blood. These "facts of nature," of course, bear further examination. In pro-reform pamphlets, articles, and speeches, and especially in Dinah Mulock Craik's novel Hannah (1872), the deceased wife's sister becomes the best wife a man could want: a sympathetic helpmate, a mother without having given birth, even an assistant in a cult of the dead. Seemingly trapped in unrewarding domestic drudgery, she instead embraces her "maternal nature" -which seems all the purer for its freedom from biological mothering and biological messiness -and risks all to marry the man who has brought it out. Indeed, the literature on both sides of the debate reveals certain gender assumptions that come as no surprise. For example, a man needs a wife, all seem to agree; the only question is, which one? The issue is not reciprocal; few participants in the debate believe that a widow needs to remarry, either for her own convenience or to obtain a father for her children. The debate thus points up an interesting contradiction in Victorian ideology about women: these dependent creatures, so often cast as vines clinging to the male oaks around them, are in fact supporting the oaks and are perfectly able to continue on their own.16 Craik's Hannah makes this clear by casting Mr. Rivers as a near-helpless sorrowing widower who, months after his wife's death, is unable to take an interest in his child or his surroundings until his sister-in-law comes to keep house (and, not incidentally, to nurse him back to psychic health).
Those in favor of lifting the prohibition, granting the male need for a wife, often argue for the sister's inherent superiority to any other wife as a stepmother (and, secondarily, a companion); those opposed question why the aunt, rather than any other, need be chosen. A "working man," James Cunningham, described his happy second marriage to his deceased wife's sister as follows: "The advantages [of the marriage] are such that could not be obtained under other circumstances: my child has not experienced the want of a mother's love; neither have I had to contend with a strange disposition; and those relics which are calculated to call up the remembrance of my late wife, are as sacred to my present wife as they are to myself; we can both mourn over her loss, and sprinkle flowers over her grave-it is almost bringing the dead to life" (1864, 2).17 The sister-in-law, a willing participant in Cunningham's cult of the dead, becomes a sexless, but familiar, mother-substitute. Hope, on the other hand, is so suspicious of stepmothers as to argue that an aunt will make the worst of all guardians for her nieces and nephews:
[S]o long as the wife's sister continues the unmarried guardian of her nephews and nieces, they will be to her the nearest and dearest, and only objects of love and care, but as soon as she marries their father she incurs the risk of having children of her own, who will be much nearer to her than her former charge. ... A good aunt may often be changed into, if not a bad, at least a less devoted step-mother; a stepmother perhaps, on account of the very relationship previously existing, more jealously alive to trifles than a stranger would have been. (1849, 75) Both sexuality and maternity are at issue in Hope's argument; women must mother, it seems, but will always mother their own in preference to another's. Hope seems to assume that an unmarried aunt can go on sexlessly, tirelessly mothering her sister's children, yet, once married, she will inevitably reproduce and thus be reduced to the biologically determined maternity that his argument otherwise so insistently denies.
Hope's fears go unanswered in the pro-reform literature; most deceased wives' sisters in the pro-reform literature seem to be conveniently beyond childbearing age. Instead, the reformers simply assert that the deceased wife's sister is the devoted (asexual) aunt whom Dr. Charles Cameron lauds in a speech to the Marriage Law Reform Association: "To me it seems to the credit of human nature that in the invidious position in which our law has placed them, these women [deceased wives' sisters] should be found so imbued with love for their dead sister and her offspring that for their dear sakes they are willing to defy the sneers of a scandal-loving and calumnious world, and risk their reputation on the shrine of a sacred duty. Rivers's change of heart after his rejection by society is comparable to the misery Agnes and Richard suffer in Skene's novel, but it leads him to a course of action-abandonment-that provides a variation on the argument, common in the pamphlets, that the only people benefiting from the prohibition are the men who want to marry and then abandon their sisters-in-law. Indeed, Major Rivers might be the man of whom a Vanity Fair correspondent cynically wrote: "It is conceivable that a man may love two charming sisters. He will be happy with either when the other dear charmer is away; and one day in the absence of the younger, he will get engaged to the elder. Suppose that he marry her and that she presently die; will he not then want to marry the second?" (Debate 1895, 104) . This rather bald suggestion that one sister may easily substitute for another (or one woman for another) merely states what is implicit in the career of Major Rivers and many of the fictitious men created as examples by debaters on both sides of the issue.
Hannah is explicitly concerned with what the woman in the case, the deceased wife's sister herself, wants and needs. Thus Bernard Rivers must, it seems, prove himself a worthy husband through years of shared domesticity, during which both parties accept their relationship as a sibling bond. As the Reverend Joshua Frederick Denham had pointed out some years earlier, marriage requires--and, implicitly, a marriage with a deceased wife's sister provides -"that all-predominant pre-requisite for happiness in married life -a sufficient opportunity of ascertaining each other's real character, disposition, and temper before they were so indissolubly united" (1847, 16). He continues, "And how can all these be so assuredly ascertained as by the displays of them by a female in her own family, to her own relations, and in her daily unpremeditated conduct, and under all circumstances, from year to year; and whose conduct is so likely to be unpremeditated and natural as the female's who has only the bare possibility before her, supposing her ever to think of such a thing, that if she outlives her sister, she might, if both parties felt a wish for it, be married to her deceased sister's husband?" (16; emphasis in original). Craik adroitly avoids the pitfalls of this argument-which makes marriage to a consanguineous sister look even better than marriage to a sister-in-law, with whom the period of 21 I differ with Gullette's reading of the novel in that she finds Hannah, and the "generic midlife couple" of which she forms one half, to be "sexual, but patient; sexual, but devoted to the children; sexual, but religious; sexual, but anxious to function within the law; sexual, but sentimental; older, but vulnerable to the temptations of propinquity; older, but sexual" (1990, 158). In my reading, the "generic midlife couple" of the pamphlets and the novel is almost nowhere sexual, and, as my discussion of Russell's novel makes cear, the reformers were not above condemning sexuality as a basis for marriage. and the husband find his best companion in one who should bring back to husband and to children the memories of her who had gone.
(Clarke 1884, 6) This speaker's easy assumption of an essential difference between men and women, with women clearly cast as naturally self-sacrificing, not only argues for passage of the Deceased Wife's Sister Bill but prevents any counterargument that allowing this marriage will allow other marriages between affines, especially those involving widows. The uniquely female bond between sisters is kept alive after death in the reformers' fictions; it transcends and tames masculine desire as it operates to ensure the continuation of the family.
Craik's heroine similarly keeps alive the memory of her sister, both in the person of her sister's daughter and in her care for the widower, Bernard Rivers. But her role as surrogate mother is not without its blessings; if Craik will not allow her heroine sexual passion, she does replace it with another: "There are women in whom mother-love is less an instinct or affection than an actual passion--as strong as, sometimes even stronger than, the passion of love itself; to whom the mere thought of little hands and little feet -especially 'my little hands, my little feet' in that fond appropriation with which one poet-mother puts it-gives a thrill of ecstasy as keen as any love-dreams.... And such a one was Hannah Thelluson"
(1:44; emphasis in original). In fact, Hannah's love for his daughter, Rosie, is a stumbling block to Rivers's love for her; anxious to avoid any shadow of ill repute falling on the child, she flees England (and Rivers) near the end of the novel to bring up Rosie alone. "Bernard's one rival, and no small one, was his own little child" (2:7). Rivers finally concedes to his daughterrival by agreeing to repatriate himself in France, where, as French subjects, he and Hannah may marry legally. In Craik's reformist imagination, Hannah's maternal nature is stronger than both her own and Rivers's desire. Even when she first recognizes that she does, indeed, love him, Craik's insistence on the role of nature is evident in Hannah's reflections on the developing attachment. As in Skene's novel, a crisis of gossip is required to bring the nascent attachment into the open: James Dixon, previously "married" to his deceased wife's sister, the nursemaid, has accused Rivers of conduct worse than his own. (Dixon has abandoned his "wife" on the pretense of a reawakened conscience.) Once the possibility of an attachment is raised in Hannah's hearing, she cannot ignore it:
Had her sister lived, he [Rivers] would have been nothing to her at all; regarded with the sacred indifference with which every pure-minded woman regards every other woman's husband. Now what was he? Not her brother-except by a legal fiction, which he had himself recognised as a fiction. Nor her lover; and yet when she recalled his looks and tones, and a certain indescribable agitation which had been upon him all evening, some feminine instinct told her that, under other circumstances, he might have become her lover. Her husband he could never be; and yet she had to go on living with him in an anomalous relationship, which was a compound of all these three ties, with the difficulties of all and the comfort of none. Her friend he was; that bond seemed clear and plain; but then is it customary for a lady to go and keep the house of a male 'friend' be he ever so tried and trusted? Society, to say nothing of her own feelings, would never allow it; and for once society is in the right. (2:2-3) To this point, Hannah's musings seem to align her with the anti-reform contingent, who recognize that families are built by "legal fiction" and believe that such fictions must be maintained to preserve the family and society at large. But the reverie continues in a way that gives primacy once again to nature in the development of love and familial attachments: "Hannah felt it so--felt that, stripping off the imaginary brother-and-sister bond, Bernard and she were exactly in the position of a lady and gentleman living together in those Platonic relations which are possible certainly, but which the wicked world never believes to be possible, and which Nature herself rejects as being out of the ordinary course of things, and therefore unadvisable" (2:3). Slipping into indirect discourse in this odd characterization of a female Nature as a disapproving middle-class gossip, Craik makes the important distinction between the "imaginary" bonds created by law and the "real" bonds of nature. Ironically, it takes Craik's fiction, and the fictional creations of the pamphlet writers, to make the case against the fictional creation of familial bonds.
Craik puts the most explicit defense of the proposed change in law into the mouth of Lord Dunsmore, the husband of Hannah's patroness, who is working in support of the bill. His words echo Hannah's: "Let a man have his natural mother, sister, wife, but no anomalous relationships which, pretending to all, are in reality none of the three" (2:128). Craik works hard to make Hannah into the oxymoronic "natural wife" of Dunsmore's speech, attributing every maternal and domestic virtue to her rather than acknowledging sexuality as a central component of wifeliness. The novel and many of the pamphlets insist that marriage with a deceased wife's sister is not biological incest; ultimately, however, the same works make a strong case in favor of incest, when it is defined as marriage be-I Gruner tween nearly-related people, or people who share a household. Indeed, this version of incest seems to promote "family values," in that the marriage of two people who are already related, already close, already connected upholds the family. The "natural" bond of mother to child, seen here as the cornerstone of family, is best maintained through marriages that preserve blood relationships, even when they are uncomfortably close, potentially incestuous. Both Russell and Craik thus rely on a discourse that reveals its own limitations and contradictions. Only in fiction do these "natural" families exist, and even in fiction "Nature" itself becomes a character, a construct, the middle-class gossip who so haunts The Mill on the Floss and other midcentury texts. Such an appeal to nature must fail and yet it seems the only successful strategy for changing a law that had, by all accounts, become an embarrassment and a focus of comedy long before it was finally repealed.22
The repeated appeal to nature in these texts would be almost amusing if it were not also somewhat threatening -if it were not made by the side that won the debate. The rhetoric of "nature" haunts even current discussions of family, especially in debates over surrogacy, abortion, the rights of adoptive versus birth mothers, and similar issues. Maternity is still a, if not the, central role for women, the defining value even when it takes on the negative valence of "unwed" or "welfare" motherhood. If this seems a hopelessly antiquated view of women's desires and roles, or a bald attempt to camouflage sexual desire by representing safer, maternal passion instead, consider Jessica Benjamin's discussion of the difficulty of identifying female desire within a psychoanalytic context: "Woman's sexuality is primarily portrayed through her object status, her ability to attract. The closest we have come to an image of feminine activity is motherhood and fertility. But the mother is not culturally articulated as a sexual subject, one who actively desires something for herself-quite the contrary. And once sexuality is cut loose from reproduction, once woman is no longer mother, we are at a loss for an image of woman's sexual agency. What is woman's desire?" (1986, 83). With Benjamin's question still unanswered, the 1907 victory of the "liberal" forces in the deceased wife's sister debate signals a defeat for women, codifying notions about women and nature that "naturally" relegate women to the home and family and promoting maternity as the culmina- 
